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1. Introduction 
I understand Contextualism to be the following semantic 
framework for understanding the meaning of moral 
terms.1 Consider the sentence ‘eating meat is wrong’. 
According to Contextualism, this sentence does not have 
truth-conditional content because ‘… is wrong’ is not a 
predicate that has a fixed property as its semantic value. 
Rather, on this view, its meaning consists merely of a 
‘character’ which can be understood as a function from 
contexts of use to fixed contents (Kaplan 1989).2 
Contextualism thus claims that, due to what the predicate 
means, only in a context of use ‘… is wrong’ will have a 
specific property as its semantic value – the context plays 
an ineliminable role in determining what that property is. 
There are two familiar versions of Contextualism 
according to which the characters of moral predicates 
contain an essential indexical element.3 According to these 
views, the contexts on which the characters of moral 
predicates operate include moral codes that are accepted 
by either the speaker (indexically, from the speaker’s 
perspective, my moral system) or her moral community 
(our moral system). Thus, according to the subjectivist 
                                                
1 My formulation of Contextualism is inspired by Björnsson and 
Finlay (2010: 7–8), Brogaard (2008: 385–386 and 400), Dreier (1990: 8, 
1999, and 2009: 79–81), and Wong (1984: Ch. 5).  
2 Character represents what one must understand in order to grasp 
the meaning of the term whereas the truth-evaluable content is what 
an expression says (Dreier 2009: 81). 
3 Historically, these views are more often understood as versions of 
subjectivism and relativism. See Montaigne (1958 [1572–1574]), 
Hobbes (2012 [1651]), Sumner (1906), and Harman (1975). ‘Character’ 
here refers to the Kaplanian characters defined above: the functions 
from contexts of use to fixed properties as semantic values. 
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versions of Contextualism (hereafter the SC-views), when 
I utter the sentence ‘eating meat is wrong’, in this context 
the utterance ascribes a certain natural property N1 (say 
that of not maximizing the amount of happiness) to eating 
meat because my moral code – as an essential element of the 
context – is against actions that are N1. Likewise, when 
you utter that same sentence, your utterance ascribes a 
different natural property N2 to eating meat because your 
moral code – as an essential element of your context – is 
against actions that are N2. Thus, on this view, the 
character of ‘… is wrong’ is a function from contexts of 
use – essentially consisting of the speakers’ moral codes – 
to certain natural properties determined those codes. 
Relativist versions of contextualism (hereafter the RC-
views) work in a similar way except here the moral code 
that determines the semantic value of ‘… is wrong’ in a 
context is not the speaker’s personal code but rather the 
code of her moral community. Thus, according to RC-
views, when I utter the sentence ‘eating meat is wrong’ 
that utterance will ascribe a certain natural property to 
actions of eating meat because the moral code internalized 
by the majority of people in my moral community is 
against the actions that have that property.  
Both subjectivist and relativist versions of Contextualism 
(hereafter the SRC-views) have important theoretical 
advantages. These views do not require positing any 
mysterious non-natural properties and yet they are able to 
rely on the standard truth-conditional, compositional 
semantics in explaining the meaning of more complex 
moral sentences. These views furthermore promise to 
solve many epistemic challenges facing other metaethical 
views and even help us to give an account of the internal 
connection between moral judgments and motivation.4  
However, because there are many compelling objections 
to the SRC-views, until quite recently most metaethicists 
have taken these views to be merely good for 
philosophical target practice. Yet, more recently, several 
metaethicists have tried to develop the SRC-views in ways 
                                                
4 For the latter advantage, see Dreier (1990); for the former, see Capps, 
Lynch and Massey (2009).  
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that could enable these views to avoid the standard 
objections to them (see footnote 1). This chapter takes part 
in that project by focusing on two objections. §2 first 
explains how the SRC-views seem unable to accommodate 
intuitive moral disagreements. It also considers how these 
views seem to lead to an unfortunate form of arbitrariness 
because we live in multicultural societies.  
This chapter then argues that these two problems can be 
solved together: the second problem provides a solution to 
the first one. §3 first explains how the popular Kratzer-
styled contextualist accounts of epistemic modals suffer 
from a corresponding disagreement problem. It also 
outlines how Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies (2011) 
rely on proposition clouds to address that challenge. §4 then 
develops a similar response to the disagreement objection 
to the SRC-views by relying on an insight extracted from 
the arbitrariness objection.  
The basic idea is that, given that we live in multicultural 
societies, the contexts in which we utter moral sentences 
fail to provide unique truth-evaluable contents for our 
moral assertions. When we make moral utterances, we can  
hence only put into play proposition clouds. Furthermore, 
because our moral discourse has a fundamental action co-
ordinating function, we, as audience members, should 
react with disagreement to those propositions in the 
relevant clouds the rejection of which will best enable us 
to co-ordinate choices and actions. §5 finally concludes by 
outlining this proposal’s advantages over its main rivals. 
2. Disagreement and Arbitrariness 
Consider the following exchange: 
(1) Ann: It is not wrong to eat meat. 
(2) Ben: No, eating meat is wrong! 
When Ann and Ben utter (1) and (2), they intuitively 
disagree. The fundamental problem with the SRC-views is 
that they cannot guarantee this. Let’s stipulate that Ann 
and Ben have internalized different moral codes. In this 
case, the SC-views entail that according to Ann’s utterance 
eating meat lacks a certain natural property whereas 
according to Ben eating meat has a different natural 
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property. In this situation, Ann and Ben would not be 
disagreeing but rather talking past one another – their 
claims could, after all, be both true at the same time.5 The 
RC-views do enable Ann and Ben to disagree when they 
belong to the same moral community.6  However, if Ann 
and Ben belong to different moral communities with 
different moral codes, these views again make them talk 
about different natural properties of actions.   
Consider also the following response from Ben (Björnsson 
and Finlay 2010: 19): 
(3) Ben: #When you utter the sentence ‘eating meat 
is not wrong’, what you say is true. 
Nevertheless, eating meat is wrong. 
This response makes no sense and yet the SRC-views seem 
to make it appropriate. On these views, what Ann asserts 
when she utters (1) is that eating meat does not have the 
relevant natural property determined by her moral code. 
According to the SRC-views, by uttering the first part of 
(3), Ben could agree that it is true that eating meat lacks 
that property. By uttering the second part of (3), he could 
then claim that eating meat is still wrong (i.e., eating meat 
has the natural property which his moral code picks out as 
salient). But, given that (3) makes no sense, the SRC-views 
arguably fail (see also §5 below).  
The second arbitrariness objection first observes that it is a 
philosophical myth that, in every area, there is a single 
moral community such that every person in that area is a 
member of that moral community and it only (Shafer-
Landau 2004: Ch. 10).7 Instead our societies are 
multicultural and we belong to many moral communities 
simultaneously. Consider Shafer-Landau’s (2004: 44) real-
life example in which, years ago in France, a young 
                                                
5 This objection was introduced by Moore (1912: Ch. 3) and Hare 
(1952: 148–149). Since them, it has become ubiquitous. 
6 See, for example, Shafer-Landau (2010: 286).  
7 Shafer-Landau (2004: Ch. 8) calls a different objection to the SRC-
views the arbitrariness objection. According to this objection, the 
concerns on which the moral standards are based cannot be supported 
by reasons in the SRC-framework and hence they must be arbitrary. 
For a response, see Blackburn (1998). 
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woman was about to be forced to undergo a 
clitoridectomy by her family. She was, fortunately, able to 
escape and she even won a lawsuit against her family.  
Consider then the young woman’s utterance ‘What they 
are doing to me is wrong!’. According to the SRC-views, 
in order to know whether this utterance is true, we must 
first know which moral code the context of the utterance 
picks out as the one that determines which natural 
property her assertion ascribes to clitoridectomy. The 
problem is that the utterance is made in a context in which 
several different communities are salient. Given that the 
young woman identified herself as a member of the 
French society, we might think that the code relevant in 
the context is the conventional French morality. Yet, the 
young woman also belonged to the Algerian immigrant 
community. Thus, the relevant moral code in the context 
could equally well be this community’s code. The problem 
is that, whichever community’s moral code is salient, that 
code determines which natural property the previous 
assertion ascribes to clitoridectomy and therefore also 
whether the assertion is true. If the French moral code is 
salient, then the young woman’s assertion is true whereas, 
if the Algerian immigrant culture’s code is salient, then 
that assertion might turn out to be false.   
In response, the defenders of the SRC-views could try to 
stipulate that the characters of moral predicates are such 
that they uniquely pick out a certain kind of communities 
and codes as salient in every context. The idea could be 
that, given the meaning the moral terms have, it is always 
the larger society whose moral code is salient. Or, perhaps 
it is always the smaller, more tight-knit community. Or, 
perhaps we should let the speaker herself to choose which 
moral community and code is relevant. The fundamental 
problem with all these solutions is arbitrariness. As 
Shafer-Landau (2004: 46) points out, whether what the 
woman’s family was trying to do was wrong is a 
substantial moral question. It seems objectionable that 
such a question could be solved merely by considering 
whether the character of moral terms is such that the 
larger community’s moral code is always salient (or the 
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smaller community’s or…). That would be solving a 
substantial moral problem on arbitrary semantic grounds. 
3. Epistemic Modals, Disagreement, and Proposition 
Clouds 
This chapter responds to the previous objections by 
drawing from the recent debates concerning epistemic 
modals.8 The following two utterances are examples of 
how modal terms can be used in an ‘epistemic flavour’ 
(i.e., as epistemic modals): 
(4) Ed: My keys might be in the car. 
(5) Fred: Your keys must be in the car.  
The standard semantic model for understanding these 
statements was developed by Angelika Kratzer (1977, 1981 
and 1991) on the basis of David Lewis’s (1973) seminal 
work. It is known as the Lewis-Kratzer Semantics or the 
Standard Ordering Semantics.  
According to this model, epistemic modals are 
propositional operators. The propositions that embed 
within their scope (in (4) and (5), the proposition that Ed’s 
keys are in the car) are called ‘prejacents’. The semantic 
role of these operators is then to quantify over a certain 
contextually determined set of worlds. The strict necessity 
modal ‘must’ functions as a universal quantifier whereas 
the weak possibility modal ‘may’ functions as an 
existential quantifier. Must (p) is thus true when p is true 
in all the relevant worlds whereas May (p) is true when p 
is true in some of those worlds. 
The model then claims that the context of use determines 
in two stages the relevant sets of worlds over which the 
epistemic modals quantify. The context first picks out a 
‘modal base’, which consists of all the worlds that are 
consistent with a body of information that has certain 
properties salient in the conversational context (such as 
being what the speaker knows, for example). The 
conversational context then also provides an ordering 
source that ranks the worlds in the modal base with a 
certain standard. In the case of epistemic modals, this 
                                                
8 For representative essays, see Egan and Weatherson (2011). 
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ordering source is based on what is stereotypical. The 
worlds in the modal base are ranked in terms of how well 
they match with what is the normal course of events 
relative to the conversational background. Must (p) is then 
true when p is the case in all the highest ranked worlds in 
the modal base whereas May (p) is true when p is true in 
some of them. 
The Standard Ordering Semantics too faces a 
disagreement objection (von Fintel and Gillies 2011: 114–
117). Imagine that Ed and Greg are trying to find Ed’s 
keys. Ed utters (4) and Greg responds: 
(6) Greg: No, they cannot be in the car. You still 
had them when we came in. 
Here Ed and Greg disagree about whether Ed’s keys 
might be in the car. When we apply the standard model, 
we must first consider which informational state is salient 
in the context as that state determines which worlds 
belong to the modal base. One alternative is to think that, 
in any context of use, what the speaker knows always 
constitutes the relevant information state. Yet, this 
assumption would make Ed and Greg talk past one 
another. Ed would claiming that in some of the worlds 
compatible with what he knows the keys are in the car, 
but Greg could not reject that proposition by claiming that 
the keys are not in the car in the worlds compatible with 
what he knows. 
The information states that are salient in the relevant 
contexts cannot therefore be what the speakers know as 
individuals. The alternative is then to think that, when Ed 
utters (4), he is claiming that the keys are in the car in 
some of the worlds compatible with the aggregate of what 
he and Greg know. Given that it is possible to understand 
Greg’s claim to be about the fact that the keys are not in 
the car in those same worlds, this view can make Ed and 
Greg disagree.  
This proposal, however, leads to a different problem. 
Given how little we usually know about what others 
know, the previous response to the disagreement problem 
makes it mysterious how we could ever use epistemic 
modals to make warranted assertions. If Ed does not know 
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what Greg knows about the keys, he cannot be justified to 
assert that the keys are in the car in the worlds that are 
compatible with his own and Greg’s knowledge. Yet, 
surely, we often are justified to use epistemic modals even 
when we know little about what others know. 
Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies (2011: 117–129) 
provide an ingenious solution to the previous dilemma.9 
They first observe that many contexts fail to ‘successfully 
resolve all indeterminacies and ambiguities’ (von Fintel 
and Gillies 2011: 117). Imagine that you are at a conference 
where a stranger wants to know where you are from. In 
this type of cases, there are often not enough contextual 
cues that would help you to interpret what the stranger is 
asking (von Fintel and Gillies 2011: 118). Does she want to 
know where you were born, where you grew up, where 
you did your PhD, where you work, or what? The context 
is just too sparse to resolve the ambiguity in question.  
Von Fintel and Gillies suggest that, similarly, when Ed 
uses the epistemic modal ‘might’ in (4), the context leaves 
it open the knowledge of which group constitutes the 
information state that generates the modal base. The 
conclusion they draw is that utterances of epistemic 
modals take ‘place against a cloud of admissible contexts – 
one for each resolution of the relevant group that is 
compatible with the facts as they are’ when the utterance 
is made (ibid.). They thus believe that, when we use 
epistemic modals, the best we can do is to put into play a 
proposition cloud. Each proposition put into play 
corresponds to the prejacent being true in either all or 
some of the worlds (depending on the epistemic modal) 
that are compatible with a body of information that is an 
aggregate of what a different group knows.  
For the audience, all the propositions put into play are 
then available for rejection and acceptance. In the previous 
example, by uttering (4), Ed puts into play at least two 
propositions: (i) that the keys are in the car at least in some 
of the worlds compatible with what he knows and (ii) that 
they are in the car in some of the worlds compatible with 
what he and Greg know in aggregate. In order to be 
                                                
9 For objections, see, e.g., MacFarlane (2010). 
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justified to put into play these propositions, Ed must be 
justified to assert at least one of them. In this case, that 
proposition naturally is the one according to which the 
keys are in the car in the worlds compatible with what he 
knows (von Fintel and Gillies 2011: 120). In order to put 
the relevant propositions into play, he thus need not be 
justified to assert the other proposition the content of 
which also depends on what Greg knows. This avoids the 
second horn of the dilemma above. 
To which propositions put into play by Ed should Greg 
then react? Von Fintel and Gillies (2011: 121) claim that, 
given the general standard norms of conversation, this is 
determined by the denial or acceptance of which 
proposition would make a suitably informative 
contribution to the conversation given its purpose. When 
Ed puts the previous propositions into play, he is 
asserting the proposition that the keys are in the car in the 
worlds compatible with what he knows and, in a way, 
simultaneously asking Greg whether the other proposition 
is true too. Knowing whether (ii) is also true would, after 
all, be informative given that this would enable Ed to 
know whether the keys are in the car in the more 
restricted set of worlds also compatible with whatever 
additional evidence Greg has. Knowing whether those 
propositions are true would hence help Ed to find his 
keys, which is the purpose of the conversation.  
In order to make an informative contribution, Greg should 
therefore either confirm or reject the proposition (ii). This 
proposition is something Greg will have a reasonable 
opinion on assuming that he has some idea of what he 
knows about the location of the keys. If part of what Greg 
knows is that Ed came in with them, then he can 
justifiably rule out that the keys are in the car in the 
worlds compatible with what he and Ed know in 
aggregate. As a consequence, we can understand the 
utterances (4) and (6) to express a genuine first-order 
factual disagreement. Ed puts into a play a cloud of 
propositions by uttering (4) and by uttering (6) Greg 
denies that some of those very propositions are true. The 
disagreement between Ed and Greg can thus be 
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understood in the traditional way as one person asserting 
and the other rejecting the very same proposition.  
The next section investigates whether the previous 
account can provide a new response to the disagreement 
objection to the SRC-views in metaethics. Before that, one 
further observation is needed. It has been argued that the 
truth of moral utterances is information-sensitive 
(Prichard 1932), which suggests that moral concepts 
contain an element of epistemic modality. Consider the 
miners case in which a group of ten miners are trapped in 
one of two shafts (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010). We do 
not know in which shafts the miners are and rising waters 
threaten their lives. We have time to block only one shaft – 
if we block the wrong one everyone dies whereas if we 
block neither shaft only one miner dies.  
Many have the intuition that it would be wrong to block a 
shaft because doing so risks nine additional lives. It has 
then been suggested that, when we say that it would be 
wrong to block a shaft, we mean that in all the worlds 
both (i) compatible with what we know and (ii) ranked 
highest by morality we do not block a shaft.10 This 
interpretation applies the Standard Ordering Semantics to 
moral expressions by assuming that (i) what is morally 
best provides the relevant ordering source and (ii) what 
we know provides the epistemic modal base of the worlds 
that are ordered. The latter feature of the proposal means 
that this view builds epistemic modality into the 
semantics of ‘wrong’.  
This proposal enables us to apply the previous idea of 
proposition clouds directly to some moral disagreements. 
Consider the following conversation between Charles who 
                                                
10 The Standard Ordering Semantics itself is problematic here. Of the 
worlds that are compatible with what we know, many ordering 
sources would rank blocking A first in the worlds in which the miners 
are in A and blocking B first in the rest of the worlds. According to the 
Standard Ordering Semantics, this entails that it would not be wrong 
to block a shaft. For this reason, it has been suggested that we 
additionally need to rely on information-sensitive ordering sources 
that rank the relevant worlds in the epistemic modal base in terms of 
expected value (Dowell 2013; Silk 2013). For an objection, see Finlay 
(2016: 186–187). 
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does not know where the miners are and David who 
knows they are in A: 
(7) Charles: It would be wrong to block a shaft. 
(8) David: No, we are definitely required to block 
shaft A – the miners are in there. 
In the current framework, Charles’s utterance puts into 
play a cloud of propositions because the context fails to 
determine a unique group whose aggregated knowledge 
generates the epistemic modal base for the evaluation of 
the truth of (7).11 Thus, according to one proposition 
Charles puts into play, neither shaft is blocked in the 
worlds that morality ranks highest of those that are 
compatible with what he knows.12 Similarly, according to 
another proposition he puts into play, neither shaft is 
blocked in the worlds that morality ranks highest of the 
worlds compatible with what he and David know in 
aggregate. David’s utterance (8) should then be 
interpreted as making an informative contribution to the 
conversation. Given that his evidence rules out the worlds 
in which the miners are in B, he can react with rejection to 
the proposition according to which no shaft is blocked in 
the worlds that are ranked highest by morality of the 
worlds that are compatible with what he and Charles 
know in aggregate. This contribution is highly informative 
because rejecting those propositions helps Charles to save 
all the miners. 13 
Thus, insofar as the truth of moral assertions is 
information-sensitive and epistemic modality is built into 
the semantics of moral terms, already the previous 
account of epistemic modals in its original form helps us 
to make sense of some moral disagreements in the 
                                                
11 According to Dowell (2013), Charles’s own referential intentions are 
sufficient to determine which proposition he asserts. It’s not clear, 
however, how Charles’s audience could access those intentions so as 
to know to which proposition they are to react. 
12 We only get this consequence if the ordering source provided by 
morality is itself information-sensitive. See footnote 9 above. 
13 On this view, moral utterances made by informed agents can often 
play an instrumental role in helping the agents to choose the most 
moral course of action. This does not entail, however, that the agents’ 
interest in morality needs to be merely instrumental. 
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contextualist framework. In this form, however, the view 
only helps us to accommodate moral disagreements 
between people who share the same moral principles but 
have different amounts of empirical information. Charles 
and David do not really disagree about whether it is right 
to save people but rather David only disagrees with 
Charles because he knows the location of the miners and 
thus is in a position to help save more lives.  
Yet, when Ann and Ben disagree when they utter (1) and 
(2), they can be in a context in which they know all the 
same empirical facts and they also know that they know 
the same facts. Because of this, their disagreement cannot 
be explained with the idea that one of them has some 
additional empirical information and thus is in a position 
to rule out additional worlds from the modal base. Rather, 
their disagreement is a more fundamental moral 
disagreement about what is right based on accepting 
different moral codes. The idea that speakers put different 
moral propositions into play with their moral utterances 
because epistemic modals are built into the meaning of 
moral terms cannot thus explain what is going on in these 
more fundamental moral disagreements. This is why the 
next section develops a contextualist account of 
disagreements that could be applied more broadly also to 
the more fundamental moral disagreements.14 
4. Moral Disagreement and Proposition Clouds 
My proposal begins from an observation concerning the 
traditional forms of relativism in metaethics: these views 
classified moral communities in a maximally coarse-
grained way. They assumed that we all belong to just one 
moral community. The idea was that, within the borders 
of a state, the citizens of that state always form the 
relevant moral community whose moral standards 
determine which actions are right and wrong within that 
                                                
14 For reasons of space, the proposal below will not include epistemic 
information-sensitivity within the contextualist semantics of moral 
terms. The proposal is, however, fully compatible with adding that 
aspect of the character of moral terms to the account. For SRC-views 
formulated explicitly in that way, see Björnsson and Finlay (2010) and 
Dowell (2013). 
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state. In some cases, the relevant moral community was 
assumed to be an even larger unit: the Western moral 
community, the Asian moral community, or the like. 
These views just did not seem to recognise any smaller 
moral communities. 
Shafer-Landau’s (2004: Ch. 10) arbitrariness objection 
shows that these assumptions are untenable. He is surely 
right in pointing out that, in addition to the large national 
moral communities, there are also many smaller moral 
communities (such as the Algerian immigrant community 
in France) to which many of us belong. When we 
recognise these smaller moral communities and the fact 
that we can belong to many of them simultaneously, there 
is no reason why we could not classify moral communities 
in a more fine-grained way. We could think, plausibly 
enough, that there exists a plenitude of overlapping moral 
communities so that we all belong to a vast number of 
different ones. Some of these moral communities are 
formed by people who live in the same area (the 
Europeans, the Brits, the Brummies, etc.), whereas others 
are formed through class membership, age, general 
interests, shared political views, immigration, ethnicity, 
profession, Facebook groups, and the like. We can even 
stipulate that, whatever relation ties a certain group of 
individuals together, these individuals thereby form a 
moral community.  
Let us then return to the original disagreement. According 
to the RC-views, when Ann utters (1), given the character 
of ‘wrong’ and the context of use, her utterance asserts 
that the actions of eating meat lack a certain natural 
property determined by the moral code of her community. 
The immediate problem is that, as we have just seen, Ann 
belongs to a number of different moral communities and 
so there is no such thing as her unique moral community. 
Furthermore, if the context of utterance is an ordinary 
conversational context, it is hard to see what contextual 
cues would suffice to help Ann’s audience to interpret 
against the moral code of which community the truth of 
her utterance should be evaluated. The context in question 
will help to rule out some moral communities as 
irrelevant. Given the constraints provided by charity, 
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presumably she cannot be talking about the type of 
actions that are forbidden by the moral code of the 
majority of the group consisting of herself, the oldest 
citizen of Iceland, and the fastest runner in Switzerland. 
Yet, even so, the context seems too poor to be able to 
disambiguate between all the things she could reasonably 
be interpreted to mean.  
The natural idea is then to think that, as a consequence, 
the best Ann can do by uttering (1) is to put into play a 
cloud of all the propositions that are not ruled out by the 
contextual cues as reasonable interpretations. Each one of 
these propositions asserts that the action of eating meat 
lacks a different natural property because the content of 
each proposition in the cloud is determined by a different 
moral community’s moral code. Ann is justified to put 
into play this proposition cloud if she is in a position to 
assert at least one of the propositions in it. Given that Ann 
herself already forms a moral community of one person, 
Ann must at least be justified to put into play the relevant 
proposition cloud. She has to be in a position to assert that 
eating meat lacks a certain natural property determined 
by her own personal moral code.  
To which proposition put into play by Ann should Ben 
then react? Above, it was suggested that the response to 
this question is provided by the general Gricean norms of 
conversation. Grice (1975: 45–46) suggested that the 
Cooperative Principle that captures what we can be 
expected to do in a conversation contains two maxims of 
quantity. We are to make our conversational contributions 
as informative as is required by the purposes of the 
conversation (we should not say too little) and we should 
also not make our contributions more informative than 
required by those purposes (we should not say too much). 
To which proposition should Ben then react so as to make 
his conversational contribution appropriately informative? 
Grice’s own formulation of the maxim of quantity answers 
this question. In order to evaluate the informativeness of a 
conversational contribution, we must first consider the 
purpose of the conversation in question. In the example 
concerning Ed’s keys, the purpose was to find Ed’s keys. 
This is why it was sufficiently informative for Greg to 
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reject the propositions according to which the keys are in 
the car in the worlds that are compatible with what he 
knows. After all, ruling those worlds out was enough to 
enable Ed to find his keys. This means that, in order to 
find out to which propositions it would be appropriate for 
Ben to react, we need to consider the fundamental 
purpose of moral conversations. 
Here I will rely on a widely held assumption according to 
which one fundamental purpose of moral discourse is to 
co-ordinate choice and action in a mutually beneficial 
manner.15 The starting point of this assumption is that, 
because we all have a vast number of different needs and 
desires and we live in circumstances in which resources 
are not unrestrictedly abundant, there are bound to be 
conflicts between us concerning resource allocation.16 Yet, 
if such conflicts were frequent and escalated into violence, 
our lives would be in Hobbes’s (2012 [1651]: Pt. 1, Ch. 13, 
para. 9) words ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.  
My assumption will be that one raison d'être of moral 
discourse and thought is to help us to avoid the previous 
type of escalating vicious conflicts.17 When individuals 
share a moral code (including its action-guiding principles 
and the corresponding reactive attitudes towards norm 
violations), they are able to avoid the previous kind of 
conflicts and their escalation in a way that also enables 
mutually beneficial co-operation. Because the adoption of 
a moral code requires certain practical attitudes, the 
individuals who adopt a shared moral code will thus 
come to have a more co-operative and altruistic stance 
towards interaction. They will constrain the selfish pursuit 
of their own interests so as to comply with the shared 
code, which prevents harm to others. They will also have 
                                                
15 This assumption thus grants that moral discourse generally serves 
an instrumental purpose. This again need not entail that the 
individuals who take part in the discourse are similarly motivated by 
instrumental reasons.  
16 In John Rawls’s (1971: §22) words, we thus live in the ‘circumstances 
of justice’. 
17 In fact, it can be argued that moral thought and talk evolved in 
human beings because of their ability to co-ordinate the actions of 
communities in a way that was an evolutionary advantage (Joyce 
2006: Ch. 4). 
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certain shared expectations concerning the execution of 
contracts and the distribution of the benefits of social co-
operation. All these shared attitudes then mean fewer 
conflicts and more of the kinds of social interaction that 
benefit everyone. Shared moral standards also prevent the 
escalation of conflicts by co-ordinating third parties to side 
with one of the two parties in a conflict and thus by 
putting social pressure on the parties in the conflict to 
solve their conflict peacefully.18 
In the following, I thus assume that one important 
purpose of moral conversations is that having such 
conversations serves the fundamental action co-ordinating 
function of the moral discourse. Through moral 
conversations we can put pressure on the choices and 
actions of others in a way that is required for meeting our 
‘competing needs in a social, cooperative setting’ 
(Blackburn 1993: 168). This assumption then helps us to 
answer the question of to which of the propositions put 
into play by Ann Ben should react so as to make his 
contribution suitably informative. I propose that, in the 
context of moral conversations, we should understand the 
informativeness of conversational contributions in terms 
of the contribution’s ability to co-ordinate behaviour in a 
way that serves the fundamental action co-ordinating 
purpose of the moral discourse.  
Recall that, when Ann utters (1), she puts into play a 
proposition cloud. According to every proposition in this 
cloud, the actions of eating meat lack a certain natural 
property determined by the moral codes of different moral 
communities. Hence, when Ben disagrees with Ann by 
uttering (2), he must be rejecting at least one of these 
propositions. By uttering (2), he must be asserting that 
eating meat actually has at least one of the salient natural 
properties determined the moral codes of the relevant 
moral communities. 19 
                                                
18 See DeScioli and Kurzban (2012). 
19 In Finlay’s (2017: 188–190) terminology, my strategy to 
accommodate intuitive moral disagreements is ‘content-based’ rather 
than non-content-based (see §5 below). 
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Above, I acknowledged that there exists a plenitude of 
different moral communities. Yet, the mere fact that 
certain moral communities are against the type of actions 
to which eating meat belongs will put very little pressure 
on Ann’s actions. For example, Ann will not be moved by 
the fact that the majority of those people who, like her, 
were born at 4.24am are against certain type of actions.20  
Firstly, it can well be that, even if most of those people are 
against the actions of the type in question, Ann does not 
belong to the majority in this respect. This means that the 
mere fact that a moral community to which she belongs is 
against eating meat need not in itself provide an internal 
reason for her not to eat meat – the kind of reason that 
would motivate her in practical reasoning that begins 
from her own cares and concerns.21 Secondly, Ann need 
not identify strongly with the other members of this 
group. She does not need to think that who she really is as 
a person is in someway dependant on being a member of 
this group. Finally, the members of this group also seem 
too unconnected to one another so as to be able to co-
ordinate their reactive attitudes and actions in a way that 
would be required for putting social pressure on the 
choices and actions of the other members of the group.  
For these reasons, if Ben were to reject the proposition 
according to which actions of eating meat do not have a 
certain natural property determined by the moral code of 
the majority of people born at 4.24am are, this would not 
be an appropriately informative contribution to his 
conversation with Ann. It would not be sufficiently 
informative because it would fail to serve the fundamental 
action co-ordinating function of the moral discourse. 
The previous example also helps us see to which 
propositions Ben should react so as to make an 
                                                
20 Because it is so obvious that no agent will be moved by this fact, the 
proposition that this community is not against eating meat did 
probably not belong to the proposition cloud put into play by Ann. 
The contextual cues present in all contexts should be sufficient for Ben 
to know that this could have been what Ann meant. I am merely using 
the example for illustrative purposes to provide a contrast to the 
communities that matter. 
21 See Williams (1979). 
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informative, action co-ordinating contribution. Ann also 
belongs to at least some moral communities such that: 
i. she shares the same core cares and concerns that 
are reflected in the moral code that is accepted by 
the majority of the community’s members, 
ii. she considers her own personal identity to be at 
least in part grounded in being a member of the 
community, and 
iii. the community in question is sufficiently close-knit 
both to be able to put significant social pressure on 
the choices and actions of its members and to be 
able to effectively side with one party in conflict 
cases. 
According to at least some of the propositions put into 
play by Ann, eating meat lacks a natural property 
determined by what types of actions are opposed by the 
previous special kind of moral communities of which Ann 
is a member. If Ben can reject these propositions (i.e., if he 
is in a position to assert that in fact eating meat has those 
very natural properties), then presumably this will put 
pressure on Ann’s actions in a way that can co-ordinate 
her and Ben’s behaviour. This is why rejecting those 
propositions would be informative (assuming that we 
understand the informativeness of moral utterances in 
terms of the moral discourse’s fundamental action co-
ordinating purpose). As a consequence, we know to which 
propositions Ben should react in the cloud put into play 
by Ann: to those that put significant pressure on Ann’s 
choices and actions. These are the propositions in which 
the semantic value of ‘… is wrong’ is determined by the 
moral codes of those moral communities that have the 
features i.–iii. introduced above. 
Let me finish by making few further observations. Firstly, 
even if I have described to which propositions Ben should 
react, this does not mean that he will respond to those 
propositions. Ben can fail to make an informative, action 
co-ordinating contribution. He can, for example, react to 
the proposition according to which eating meat does not 
have a certain natural property determined by his own 
19 
 
personal moral code.22 Yet, rejecting this proposition will 
have only a limited effect on Ann’s behaviour – it will 
move her only to the extend that she cares about her 
relationship to Ben. 
How can Ann know to which proposition Ben is actually 
reacting? Ben’s own utterance (2) itself is not very helpful 
in this respect – it will not enable Ann to understand what 
Ben means. After all, just like Ann’s own utterance, it too 
can only put into play a proposition cloud. There are, 
however, two methods that Ann can use to hone in on the 
meaning of Ben’s response. Firstly, she too has 
internalized the same conversational maxims that she 
should assume guide Ben’s conversational contributions. 
Thus, she can initially assume that Ben is reacting to the 
propositions that matter in terms of co-ordination. As a 
consequence, she is warranted to assume that Ben is 
talking about the natural properties that are determined 
by the moral codes of the communities that are important 
to her are.23  
Secondly, moral conversations rarely consist only of a 
short exchange of blunt utterances such as (1) and (2). 
Rather, the conversations that start in this way usually 
continue with a game of giving and receiving reasons. Ben 
would presumably next talk about the considerations that 
he thinks make eating meat wrong – he might argue that 
                                                
22 Assuming that this proposition was one of the propositions put into 
play by Ann, in this case Ben would still be disagreeing with her. It’s 
just that his disagreeing contribution to their conversation would not 
be very informative. 
23 One potential objection at this point concerns disagreement cases in 
which the participants share no common cares, concerns, or moral 
standards. Imagine a disagreement case like this between a vegan and 
a carnivore, where the participants are also members of distinct vegan 
and carnivore communities. In this case, it might be argued that these 
individuals could not disagree according to my proposal because 
these individuals do not belong to the same communities that could 
co-ordinate their actions effectively.  Here I want to suggest that one 
of the propositions in the cloud put into play by the vegan could be 
that the use of animal products has a certain natural property 
determined by the moral code accepted by the majority of the man-
kind. The carnivore could then reject at least this proposition. This 
contribution to the conversation would, of course, be only weakly 
coordinating but sometimes, given the conversational context, the 
most informative utterances we can make are not very informative.  
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factory farming causes suffering or that meat production 
is a significant contributor to climate change. One way to 
understand these further contributions is to think of them 
as narrowing down the context of utterance for (2). They 
provide contextual cues for Ann that enable her to 
interpret to which proposition Ben is reacting. The 
previous claims about reasons, for example, should tell 
her that Ben’s utterance in (2) must in some way concern 
the moral communities to which she belongs the 
majorities of which are against actions that cause suffering 
or climate change. That is, by referring to these reasons, 
Ben can help Ann to understand that he rejected the 
propositions in the relevant cloud according to which 
eating meat does not have the natural properties 
determined by what type of actions are disapproved of by 
the moral communities that care about pain, suffering, 
and climate change and of which Ann is a member. 
Let me then conclude by summarizing how the previous 
proposals enables the SRC-views to make sense of the 
genuine disagreement between Ann and Ben: (i) given the 
context of utterance and the lack of contextual cues, when 
Ann utters (1) she can only put into play a cloud of 
propositions; (ii) by uttering (2) Ben reacts to some of the 
propositions put into play by outright rejection and so the 
disagreement is an ordinary first-order factual 
disagreement; (iii) we can explain to which propositions 
Ben should react to by considering the action co-
ordinating function of the moral discourse; and (iv) these 
norms and further exchanges about reasons can help Ann 
to understand what Ben in fact means. 
5. The Alternatives   
This final section will briefly outline two alternative 
theories, which the defenders of the SRC-views have 
already tried to use for making sense of moral 
disagreements. I will also introduce some of the problems 
of these proposals and consider how the previous 
section’s proposal can avoid them.  
Traditionally, the defenders of the SRC-views have often 
endorsed the expressivists’ disagreement in attitude account 
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of moral disagreement.24 This proposal grants that Ann’s 
and Ben’s assertions (1) and (2) can both be true at the 
same time because they are about different natural 
properties. This proposal thus accepts that there need not 
be a factual disagreement between Ann and Ben. It then, 
however, notes that Ann and Ben presumably have 
conflicting attitudes of approval and disapproval towards 
eating meat.25 Ann is, after all, implying that actions of 
eating meat are not the type of actions against which her 
own moral code is whereas Ben implies that those actions 
are the kind of actions against which his own moral code 
is. Ann and Ben can thus be claimed to have a 
disagreement in attitude: they have a ‘clash of practical 
attitudes’ in the same way in which we can disagree when 
we have different plans concerning where we are to go for 
dinner together. 
To see why this view is problematic, we must first notice 
that Ben could express his disagreement with Ann also in 
the following way (Schroeder 2008: 17): 
(9) Ben: What Ann just said is false.   
One problem is that, according to the traditional 
interpretations of the SRC-views, Ben could not make this 
assertion because the proposition Ann asserted – what she 
said – is true according to these views. The actions of 
eating meat can really lack the natural property 
determined by Ann’s own moral code.  
In response, Brogaard (2008: 400), Björnsson and Finlay 
(2010: 20–21), and Finlay (2017: 201) have suggested that, 
due to the conversational context, the expression ‘What 
Ann just said…’ does not here pick out the proposition 
Ann asserted but rather the proposition which Ben could 
assert by uttering ‘Eating meat is wrong’ himself in the 
                                                
24 Stevenson introduced the account first in his prescriptivist 
framework (1944: 2–8). In the debates concerning the SRC-views, it 
has been defended, for example, by Wong (1984 and 2011), Harman 
(1996), Dreier (1999: 569 and 2009: 106), Jackson (2008: 81–82), 
Björnsson and Finlay (2010: 27–28), and Finlay (2014). 
25 Finlay (2017: 191) calls this account ‘quasi-expressivist’ because 
many defenders of the view suggest that moral utterances 
pragmatically express the conflicting attitudes. 
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context.26 However, even if there exists linguistic devices 
that pick out unasserted propositions in the previous 
radically context sensitive way, ‘What X just said…’ does 
not seem to one of them – at least not in the ordinary non-
moral contexts.27 Rather, in these contexts, this expression 
seems to function uniformly as a device for indirect 
quotation.  
Consider a situation in which Ann utters:  
(10) Ann: I was told that Sally stole the money.28 
In this example, I could use the phrase ‘Yes, that’s true’ to 
agree with the proposition that Sally stole the money 
(which was not asserted by Ann). Yet, by saying that 
‘What she just said is false!’ I would only be able to deny 
that Ann was told that Sally stole the money (i.e., the 
asserted proposition). In this non-moral context, the 
reference of this expression just does not switch from the 
asserted proposition about what Ann was told to the 
unasserted proposition concerning what Sally has done. 
This means that defending the SRC-views with the 
disagreement in attitude strategy requires thinking that 
expressions such as ‘What she just said…’ pick out the 
propositions that are not asserted in the moral contexts 
and yet asserted propositions in the non-moral contexts. 
The problem is that this assumption seems ad hoc – it 
seems that the only motivation for making it would be 
theory-driven, motivated by an attempt to save the SRC-
views from the objection.29  
In contrast, the proposal described above does not require 
the previous assumption. It is compatible with the view 
that ‘What she just said…’ functions also in the moral 
                                                
26 As Finlay (2017: 200–201) notes, defenders of the disagreement in 
attitude view could turn metalinguistic at this point. For problems of 
this response, see below.  
27 For examples of such devices, see Björnsson and Finlay (2010: 19) 
28 I borrow this example from Björnsson and Finlay (2010: 19). 
29 Perhaps due to this kind of concerns, more recently Finlay (2017: 
202) has suggested that we can explain at least some of our intuitions 
about disagreements away on the basis of semantic opacity – the idea 
that we, as ordinary speakers, are not aware of the fact that in some 
cases we can end up talking past one another. For further problems of 
the view, see Ridge (2013) and Björnsson (2017). 
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contexts in the standard way as a device for indirect 
quotation that uniformly picks out the proposition 
asserted by the previous speaker. It’s just that, according 
to this proposal, at least in the moral contexts the previous 
speaker puts into a play a whole cloud of propositions and 
so the new speaker can, in principle, use a sentence 
beginning with ‘What she just said…’ to express her 
agreement or disagreement with any one of these 
propositions. Thus, one reason for preferring the 
proposition cloud proposal is that it does not require 
making any ad hoc assumptions about how certain 
expressions used to refer to other propositions function. 
The second suggestion is that we should understand 
moral disagreements such as the one between Ann and 
Ben as metalinguistic negotiations concerning which 
moral concepts should be adopted.30 Many formulations 
of this proposal rely on the idea that different speakers 
and communities have different moral concepts, which is 
not compatible with the kind of Contextualism explored in 
this chapter. For this reason, I need to reformulate the 
proposal in a slightly different way. 
Let’s assume that the character of the moral terms is such 
that when Ann asserts (1) her assertion is about a certain 
natural property determined by the moral code of her own 
moral community. Likewise, when Ben asserts (2) his 
assertion is about a different natural property determined 
by the moral code of his moral community. As a 
consequence, let’s assume that there is no first-order 
factual disagreement between Ann and Ben as they are 
talking past one another. Yet, intuitively we would think 
that they disagreed. 
Here’s how the metalinguistic proposal promises to 
accommodate that disagreement intuition. One way to 
understand the character of a moral term is that it is a 
function from the contexts of use to different natural 
properties as semantic values. This means that, in the 
                                                
30 For different variations of the view, see Robinson (2010), Plunkett 
and Sundell (2013), Khoo and Knobe (2016), Bolinger (ms), and Silk 
(2016: 128–129 and 2017: 214 and 222–223) even if Silk (2017:225) 
himself does not classify his view as metalinguistic (for a discussion, 
see Finlay 2017: 196 fn. 26). 
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previous example, even if Ann and Ben are talking to one 
another and so in a loose sense belong to the same 
conversational context, we should properly speaking 
think that their utterances are made in different contexts 
of use. The context of use for Ann’s utterance is the moral 
code of her community, which explains why the semantic 
value of ‘… is wrong’ in Ann’s mouth is a certain natural 
property. Likewise, the context of use for Ben’s utterance 
is a different moral code – his community’s code, which 
explains why the semantic value of ‘… is wrong’ in his 
mouth is a different natural property. 
The metalinguistic proposal then is that, even if Ann and 
Ben are literally talking past one another and there is no 
factual first-order disagreement between them, they can 
be understood to be disagreeing in a different, non-
standard way. This is because, in the conversation, they 
are both trying to get their conversational partner to move 
to the same context of use as they are in themselves. Thus, 
by asserting (2), Ben is trying to get Ann to join his moral 
community that is against eating meat so that the context 
of use for Ann’s moral utterances too would become the 
moral code of his moral community. If Ben were 
successful, not only would Ann’s previous assertion 
become false but she would also come to adopt the 
vegetarian moral code of Ben’s community, which would 
effectively co-ordinate her and Ben’s actions to not eating 
meat. As we saw above, this type of action co-ordination 
can be understood to be the reason why the conversation 
is taking place in the first place. Likewise, Ann too is, 
according to this proposal, trying to get Ben to switch over 
to the context of the moral code of her own moral 
community, which too would help her to get Ben to co-
ordinate his actions with her meat eating habits.  
The problem with this proposal is that it fails to make 
sense of disagreements in eavesdropping cases.31 Consider 
                                                
31 For a similar objection, see Finlay (2017: 194). One strategy to 
respond to this concern is to limit the scope of the disagreements to 
which the account is supposed to apply (see Silk (2017) and Khoo and 
Knobe (2016: 3)). Yet, this entails that my proposal should be 
preferred on the grounds of simplicity. According to Finlay, different 
versions of the metalinguistic proposal also threaten to mislocate the 
disagreements (192–193), fail to accommodate disagreements between 
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the following exchange between Isabel and James who are 
listening to the conversation between Ann and Ben from a 
distance: 
(11) Isabel: No, Ann is mistaken – eating meat is 
wrong! 
(12) James: You are right – she is mistaken. 
Intuitively, here too, Isabel disagrees with Ann. Yet, this 
disagreement between Isabel and Ann cannot be 
construed as a metalinguistic negotiation concerning 
which moral code should be adopted as the shared context 
of use. The purpose of Isabel’s utterance cannot be to get 
Ann to join the context of Isabel’s moral code given that 
Ann is not even aware of Isabel’s existence and so her 
utterance cannot have any influence on which moral code 
Ann adopts as the relevant context for her moral 
utterances. The fact that Isabel disagrees with Ann also 
cannot be understood as consisting of a metalinguistic 
negotiation between Isabel and James given that they 
already know that they both share the same moral code 
and thus belong to the same context. The metalinguistic 
proposal thus seems to lack the resources required for 
dealing with disagreements such as the one between Ann 
and eavesdropper Isabel. 
In contrast, the proposal outlined in §4 can do better. 
According to it, Ann’s assertion (1) puts into a play a 
proposition cloud. Her audience can then react to these 
propositions by either accepting or rejecting them. This is 
why Isabel can react with rejection to those propositions in 
play the rejection of which would make a suitably 
informative contribution to the conversation she is having 
with her fellow eavesdropper James (see von Fintel and 
Gillies 2011: 127–129). Thus, Isabel’s disagreement with 
Ann can again be understood as an ordinary first-order 
factual disagreement – she is flat out rejecting one of the 
things Ann said. Yet, her rejection of that proposition put 
into play by Ann can be informative in the conversion she 
has with James, as it can co-ordinate action and choice. By 
uttering (11), Isabel can confirm whether she and James 
                                                                                                     
people who are not speaking to one another (195), and/or entail both 
too many disagreements and too few instances of agreement (197).  
26 
 
are on the same page with regards to eating meat and also 
check whether they would side with the same person in 
disagreements over meat eating on future occasions. 
This means that one advantage of my proposal is that it 
can accommodate a wider range of disagreement cases 
than the metalinguistic proposal. In addition to enabling 
the SRC-views to understand moral disagreements as 
ordinary first-order factual disagreements and thus in 
addition to addressing the most common objection to 
these views, the proposal outlined in §4 also therefore 
does better than the previous proposals. It does not 
require making any ad hoc assumptions about how certain 
devices of indirect quotation function in moral contexts 
and it can also deal with the disagreement cases, which 
the metalinguistic proposal fails to accommodate. I thus 
conclude that the proposition cloud account is the most 
promising alternative for the contextualists. 
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